Maritime security · Analysis · 3 October 2026
Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab: Two Chokepoints, Two Different Risk Profiles
The current maritime security environment in the Middle East should not be assessed through a single regional threat model. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab represent different types of maritime risk, requiring different responses from governments, naval forces and commercial operators.
My assessment is that Hormuz represents the greater strategic disruption risk, while Bab el-Mandab is more amenable to risk mitigation under a contained scenario — although that distinction could change rapidly if the conflict in Yemen escalates.
Hormuz: the strategic disruption scenario
Hormuz is particularly sensitive because the threat is closely connected to state-level military confrontation involving Iran. Any escalation could affect not only individual vessels but the wider continuity of energy flows.
The key concern is therefore not simply whether a ship is attacked. A more consequential scenario would involve a combination of vessel harassment or seizure, mining threats, military deployments and restrictions on navigation. Even without a formal closure, these developments could cause shipping companies to reassess voyages, increase war-risk premiums and alter vessel movements.
Bab el-Mandab: a different operational problem
Bab el-Mandab presents a more complex multi-layered maritime security environment. Commercial vessels face potential threats from missiles and drones, small craft, illegal boardings, piracy and broader regional instability.
However, under a contained scenario, the risk is more amenable to mitigation through layered maritime security measures: maritime domain awareness, intelligence-sharing, naval patrols, defensive capabilities and, where appropriate, escort arrangements.
This does not eliminate the threat. Rather, it provides commercial operators with more tools to reduce exposure and maintain operational continuity.
The critical variable: Saudi–Ansar Allah escalation
The situation changes significantly if Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah return to sustained hostilities.
A renewed conflict could transform the maritime environment from a relatively contained shipping-security problem into a broader military battlespace. Saudi infrastructure and ports could become targets, while attacks from Yemen could become more frequent or geographically dispersed.
Recent reporting has described Saudi preparations for a potential offensive against Ansar Allah; I treat this explicitly as a scenario input and reported development, not as an established decision that an offensive will occur.
Under such a scenario, naval escorts would remain valuable, but escorts alone would not be sufficient. They can provide deterrence, early warning and defensive support, but they cannot eliminate shore-based missile and drone threats or prevent the wider conflict from generating new attack vectors.
My 4–8 week assessment
I would monitor three potential pathways:
- Containment. Attacks remain limited, naval forces increase surveillance and protection, and commercial traffic adapts. Bab el-Mandab remains operational despite elevated risk.
- Escalation in Yemen. Saudi–Ansar Allah fighting expands, producing increased missile/drone activity and greater pressure on commercial shipping. Escort requirements and war-risk premiums increase, while some operators reconsider Red Sea transits.
- Regional escalation. The Yemen theatre becomes connected to a wider confrontation involving Iran and other regional actors. At that point, the distinction between the two chokepoints becomes less relevant because shipping could face simultaneous pressure across Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, Bab el-Mandab and the Red Sea.
The indicator that would move my assessment from containment toward the Yemen-escalation pathway would be a sustained increase in Saudi–Ansar Allah military activity accompanied by a measurable rise in attacks or attempted attacks against commercial shipping and maritime infrastructure.
What I would watch
For maritime intelligence purposes, the most important indicators are not only attacks themselves, but changes in behaviour: naval deployments, military activity around ports and chokepoints, vessel diversions, AIS anomalies, insurance movements, changes in escort patterns, attacks against energy infrastructure and changes in the nationality or ownership profiles of targeted vessels.
The key intelligence question is therefore:
Does the threat remain a series of containable maritime security incidents, or does it develop into a sustained campaign capable of disrupting the continuity of commercial shipping?
Originally published by Ghassen Chatbouri on LinkedIn.